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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of the introduction of an academic dismissal (AD) policy (i.e. 
an intervention which can lead to compulsory student withdrawal) on student dropout, student 
graduation rates and satisfaction with the study program. Using a Difference-in-Differences 
type of estimator, we compare programs that introduced an AD policy with a control group of 
programs which did not employ an AD policy. The robustness of the results is tested by a 
propensity score matching. The outcomes suggest that the implementation of an academic 
dismissal policy results in a higher first year dropout rate, and a higher student graduation 
rate. The results also indicate that, on average, student satisfaction decreases due to the 
introduction of an AD policy, while student satisfaction regarding program feasibility 
increases when an AD policy is employed.  
 
JEL-Classification:  I21; I22 
Key words:  Higher education; Admission policy; Compulsory student withdrawal; 
Student satisfaction; School dropout; Student graduation. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the 1990s, governments’ interest in performance based funding has increased (Burke & Serban, 
1997; Jongbloed & Koelman, 1996). By introducing some form of performance-based funding (PBF), 
many national authorities aim at pressuring higher education institutions to become more accountable, 
more efficient and more productive in the use of public resources (Alexander, 2000). To reflect the 
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many dimensions of the outputs of higher education institutes in terms of quantity and quality, most 
PBF mechanisms use a number of different indicators, including the number of credits accumulated 
by students, the number of degrees awarded, or the number of research publications (Jongbloed & 
Vossensteyn, 2001). The PBF mechanism provides several related challenges to higher education 
institutions. We focus on three major ones, while ignoring others (e.g., keeping and improving quality 
standards; improving research performance). 
First, stakeholders of higher education institutes are increasingly focusing on student 
graduation rates as it is considered as a measure of institutional effectiveness (Fike & Fike, 2008).
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Since the introduction of cost-sharing, parents and students benefit from students who graduate ‘on 
time’ as no extra tuition has to be paid (Johnstone, 2004). Because of the implementation of PBF, 
higher education institutes also benefit from graduation within the nominal study time, as graduation 
will lead to higher and sooner funding.  
Second, higher education institutions put more emphasis on student satisfaction. Evidence 
indicates that dissatisfied students often become dropouts (Bryant, 2006). Moreover, it has been 
argued that students prefer to enroll in institutions with high perceived student satisfaction. Therefore, 
many institutions are investing in measures that increase student satisfaction (e.g., mentoring and 
coaching, sports facilities, study choice centrums; Bettinger and Baker, 2011). Other advantages of 
high student satisfaction, as indicated by Miller (2003), are high retention and graduation rates, low 
loan default rates and increased alumni giving.  
 Third, higher education institutes became increasingly selective in accepting students as they 
are held accountable for the relative efficiency in awarding diplomas. Current practices fall apart in 
two mechanisms. There is selection ‘at the gate’ which accepts only students with a high possibility of 
successfully obtaining the degree within the study period (Beller, 2001; Salvatori, 2001). Examples of 
such selection mechanisms include the use of the Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) score and/or 
selection interviews. Next, there is selection ‘after the gate’, which allows all students to enroll in the 
first year of study. However, it has some strict rules on who can continue in or after the first year 
(Duijndam & Scheepers, 2009; Lindo et al., 2010). Examples of these screening tools include the use 
of first-year credits (ECTs) and first-year grade point averages (GPA).  
 
In the Netherlands, 7% of the total higher education budget is reserved for performance agreements 
between the government higher education institutions (both universities and higher vocational 
education). The main indicators of these agreements are dropout and completion rates. Due to the 
performance agreements many institutions decided to introduce an ‘academic dismissal’ (AD) policy. 
This intervention is based on a law of 1993 which obliged higher education institutions to provide 
first-year students with an advice regarding the continuation of their studies. Since 1997, some 
institutions have chosen to make this advice obligatory and to expel students who did not reach a 
predetermined credit threshold from the study program and the institution. Due to the performance 
agreements and the increased attention towards graduation and dropout rates, the popularity of the AD 
policy has increased rapidly the last couple of years.    
 
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, while selection ‘after the gate’ is growing 
in popularity (e.g., in The Netherlands, Canada, US), little is known about its effects on student 
dropout, graduation rates and student satisfaction (see Lindo et al., 2010; Van Heerden, 2013). This 
paper is the first to test the following research hypothesis: 
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The introduction of an academic dismissal (AD) policy results in higher first year student 
dropout, increased graduation rates and a decrease in student satisfaction.  
 As a second contribution, earlier literature on the influence of student selection mainly uses 
descriptive and correlational methodologies (e.g, Leverett-Main, 2004; Arnold and van den Brink, 
2010; Moore et al., 2009). Unfortunately, if a proper control group is lacking, one cannot obtain 
causal evidence. This paper exploits the rich panel structure of the data and identifies the effect of an 
academic dismissal policy by a difference-in-differences (DiD) type of estimator.  The estimator 
examines the effect of a treatment by comparing the treatment group after treatment against the 
treatment group before treatment and against a control group. To test the robustness of the results, we 
also use propensity score matching.  
As a third contribution, we focus on the Netherlands for which we have a rich data set at 
program level (also denoted by academic degree). The Netherlands make an interesting case study for 
two reasons. Performance indicators as student dropout, student graduation rates and student 
satisfaction are measured in a nation-wide standardized way, which limits measurement errors and 
results in uniform data across institutions and academic degrees.  
 
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the Dutch setting. In Section 3, we 
outline the literature review on student selection mechanisms, student dropout, student graduation, 
and student satisfaction. A next section discusses the identification strategy, the assumptions behind 
the methodology and the data. Section 5 presents the results, which are followed by robustness tests. 
We conclude the paper with policy advice.  
 
2. Setting  
2.1 The Dutch higher education system 
Dutch higher education is organized as a binary system and consists of governmental funded and 
private funded institutes. Approximately 88% of the students attend a governmental funded institution 
(Jongbloed et al., 2004). This paper focusses only on the group of institutions with governmental 
funding, which consists of 17 universities and 39 institutes for higher vocational education. In 
addition, the Open University provides higher education through distance learning. While the 
universities prepare students for independent scientific work in an academic or professional setting, 
higher vocational institutes prepare students for the practice of a profession. Approximately one-third 
of the higher education students enroll in universities, while two-thirds enroll in the higher vocation 
institutes (Huisman, 2008). By following specific tracks in secondary education, Dutch students are 
sorted for continuing education and prepared for specific disciplines (De Koning et al., 2014). 
Admission to universities is open to students who have a certificate of pre-university education or a 
first-year certificate from a vocational higher education institute. Students who hold a certificate of 
senior general secondary education, secondary vocational education or pre-university education can 
enter higher vocational institutes (Huisman, 2008).  
As of 2002, Dutch higher education institutes offer programs of 60 credit points per year in 
accordance to the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS). Credit points measure the workload or 
‘study time’ that is required to complete a course or program. In the Netherlands, as in most European 
countries, a norm for a credit point is a workload of 28 hours, meaning that a program year consists of 
1680 hours of work a year. The workload of students consists of the hours in classes and the hours 
needed to prepare for classes, exams and other forms of assessments.  
 
2.2 Academic dismissal policy 
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In the Netherlands, universities and higher vocational institutes are legally obliged to provide each 
student with an advice on the continuation of their studies by the end of the first year of enrollment 
(Law on Higher Education and Scientific Research, art. 7.8b). Based on this law, higher vocational 
institutions can issue obligatory (binding) advice to students (Onderwijs Evaluatie Rapport, 2007). 
Issuing obligatory (binding) advice can be seen as an AD policy (in Dutch ‘Bindend Studie Advies’). 
Whether a binding advice is positive or negative depends on the number of study credit points
3
 
obtained by the student during the first year. Every course that students follow is linked to a number 
of credits, depending on the workload. When students pass the course, they earn the corresponding 
credits. Students who do not earn a sufficient number of credits to reach the threshold, and thus make 
substandard progress after the first year, are dismissed. The credit-threshold students must pass is 
decided by each institution and can vary by program, and type of higher education (De Koning et al., 
2014). On average, the standard is 41 ECs in higher vocational education, whereas the credit-norm is 
38 ECs at universities (Inspectie van het onderwijs, 2010). Before an AD policy is issued, students 
receive an academic warning, hereby giving them a wake-up call and a chance to improve their 
performance (Rijksoverheid, n.d.). When academic dismissal is issued it leads to the termination of 
the student’s enrolment for the current program. Further, dismissed students cannot register for the 
same study program for a certain period, often three years (De Koning et al., 2014). During the 
academic year 2007/2008, the vocational institutes issued more than 14,000 academic warnings, while 
in the scientific education over 3,900 academic warnings were given (Inspectie van het onderwijs, 
2010). 
By using an AD policy, two objectives are pursued. First, it helps students to learn at an early stage 
whether the program fits them. Second, it allows programs to select and continue with the most 
talented and motived students after the first year (De Koning et al., 2014). Because the AD policy is in 
line with the orienting, selecting and referential function of the propaedeutic phase in higher 
education, it is used in many universities and vocational institutes (Onderwijsraad, 2008).  
 
While non-obligatory study warnings are a tradition in Dutch higher education, the use of AD policies 
increased considerably in the last few years. In 1997, only one university had implemented an AD 
policy (Onderwijs Evaluatie Rapport, 2007). In 2000, 67% of all vocational study programs made use 
of an AD policy against 10% of the study programs at university level. Due to the increased attention 
towards the increase of graduation rates and the decrease of dropout more institutions started to 
implement AD policies. Moreover, 98% of the study programs at vocational level and 43% of the 
study programs at university level had an AD policy against 2007. These study programs were 
localized at 40 higher vocational institutions and seven universities. At university level, the use of an 
AD policy is most common in the study fields Economics, Law, Linguistics & Culture, and 
Behavioral & Social Sciences. The interest concerning the use of an AD policy is still increasing 
(Inspectie van het onderwijs, 2010). This process is represented in figure 1 which shows the 
percentage of programs with an AD policy
4
. We observe a steep increase in the use of AD policies 
between the academic years 2006-07 and 2008-09. During this time period, an extra 10% of the 
programs decided to implement an AD policy. Figure 2 presents the number of programs per credit 
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threshold. We observe that the majority of the credit threshold is 36-40 ECTS, followed by 41-45 
ECTS. There is also a tendency towards higher thresholds.  
 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of academic programs with an AD policy per year 
 
 
Figure 2: The number of programs per credit threshold per year  
 
 
 
3. Literature Review 
Higher education institutions are increasingly held accountable for their students (Huisman & Currie, 
2004). In some countries, financial agreements between the government and higher education 
institutions even include targets on student dropout, student graduation and student satisfaction (in 
Australia, the Netherlands, Hong Kong) (OCW, 2011; Benneworth et al., 2011). We review the 
literature on student performance indicators and student satisfaction.  
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3.1  Student performance indicators. 
3.1.1 Student dropout and student graduation 
Different studies show  that high freshman attrition rates go hand in hand with a higher percentage of 
students graduating on time (e.g., Lau, 2003; Levitz et al., 1999). As a result, institutions try to 
stimulate graduation rates by keeping first-to-second-year dropout under control. The student 
integration model of Tinto (1975, 1993) and the student attrition model of Bean (1990) conceptualize 
the dropout phenomenon. These conceptual models acknowledge the important role of organizational 
factors and the commitment to the institution. Furthermore, there is a wide variation of dropout rates 
within groups of similar institutions which suggests that institutions can control their dropout rates 
(first noted by Forrest, 1982). Not surprisingly there exists an extensive body of research that 
identifies the conditions in which institutions should place their students in order to promote student 
retention and student graduation
5
.  
 First, student/staff ratios are positively correlated with dropout rates (e.g., Scott et al., 2008) 
and negatively with graduation rates (Bound et al., 2010). Indeed, a low student/staff ratio will lead to 
frequent interaction between student and staff which in turn will lead to student academic integration 
and persistence (Tinto, 2002). Next, differences in student success and student dropout can be due to 
differences in institutional size. Most studies (e.g., Calcagno et al, 2008) find a negative relationship 
between institutional size and individual success. Chickering and Reisser (1993) offer one explanation 
as to why student outcomes are negatively affected by institutional size. Moreover, if the institution 
increases in size, the amount of students increases faster than the number of settings such that the ratio 
of people to settings increases. Consequently, social and academic support suffers. Conversely, Titus 
(2004) finds that the average chance of dropout can be decreased by four percent by a one standard 
deviation increase in institutional size. 
Besides institutional structures, student characteristics can also influence educational 
outcomes. Research finds mixed results regarding the influence of gender on dropout and student 
achievement. Several studies (e.g., Scott et al., 2006; Peltier et al., 1999) find that gender is 
significantly related to student dropout and graduation. Peltier et al. (1999) conclude that women are 
less likely to dropout than men. In the same vein, Porter (2000) and Scott et al. (2006) indicate that 
vocational institutions that are more female are expected to have higher graduation rates. These 
gender differences in degree performance may be the result of differences (i) in psychological and/or 
biological factors and (ii) in characteristics that are correlated with attainment (e.g. family 
background), (McNabb, 2002; Mellanby et al., 2000).  Nevertheless, Reason (2003) fails to find a 
significant relationship between dropout and gender. Bailey et al. (2006), on the other hand, find a 
negative relationship between the percentage of female students and graduation rates. The class level 
of students can also influence the dropout process. The class level (graduate or undergraduate) is 
based on the number of credit hours a student has earned, and hence the study year the student is 
enrolled at. Bean and Bradley (1986) claim that class level has a positive impact on performance. This 
finding is in line with a more recent study which finds that cumulative GPA is negatively related to 
dropout (Okun, 1998). Adelman (2006) also shows that the cumulative credits and GPA are 
negatively associated with dropout and positively linked to graduation. The above findings can be 
attributed to the fact that students learn how to get better grades as they progress through their 
educational careers. Finally, academic effort, measured by study skills, also predict student dropout 
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and student graduation. Pantages and Creedon (1978) find that students with poor study habits have a 
higher likelihood of becoming a dropout. It is also shown that students who participated in a study 
skills course acquired higher grades than predicted by their previous academic  performance (Cone & 
Owens, 1991). In a similar vein,  more recent studies (e.g. Hughes & Pace, 2003; Kuh et al., 2008 ; 
Chambers, 2009) show that student engagement, as a proxy of student effort, is negatively related to 
dropout.  
 
3.1.2 AD policy as a form of selection after the gate 
Due to the increased accountability towards their students and the financial agreements which are 
often in place, institutions try to improve the earlier discussed performance indicators. Many 
institutions focus on interventions aimed at first-year students since Levitz et al. (1999) noted that this 
is the most crucial period for students. Some institutions try to achieve this by introducing more 
selective admission standards, which reduce the number of applicants, and make a distinction between 
the students who are likely to succeed and the students who are likely to dropout (Duncan-Hewitt, 
1996; Hagedorn & Nora, 1996; Beecher & Fischer, 1999). Cox et al. (2005) indicate that more 
selective admission standards have been related to higher retention rates. While in the past admission 
standards often had a focus ‘at’ the gate, today admission standards “after’ the gate are becoming 
increasingly popular.  
Selection ‘after the gate’ denotes performance based mechanisms to remove students making 
unsatisfactory academic progress from the institution. Performance based selection systems have a 
general structure. If a student’s performance falls below the minimum standards of the enrolled 
institution, the student gets a warning which serves as a wake-up call and can lead to escalating 
penalties. Ideally, selection ‘after the gate’ should happen in the first year as Yorke and Longden 
(2004) call this a critically important period for the connection between students and their programs. 
Bénabou and Tirole (2003) argue that the impact of performance standards on students differs by the 
type of students. Setting performance standards can motivate some students to improve their 
performance while others can be discouraged from making any attempt at all.  
In the Netherlands, many universities and vocational institutes implemented such system in 
the form of an AD policy (Van Heerden, 2013). This system requires students to make satisfactory 
study progress during their first year (see section 2.2). Studies find mixed results concerning the 
influence of AD policies on dropout and graduation. Duijndam and Scheepers (2009) indicate that the 
introduction of an AD policy in a business management program resulted in earlier students’ 
withdrawal in the first year, compared to programs where no AD policy is in use. This shows that 
fewer students linger in the program because of the introduction of a credit threshold. According to 
Gijbels et al. (2004) an AD policy is an effective tool for the identification of well-performing 
students. By comparing two cohorts of students (one in which an AD policy was implemented and 
one in which this was implemented fictitiously) evidence was found that students who would have 
been dismissed, if their institute applied a credit threshold, obtained lower numbers of credits in their 
second year. Also a lower first-year completion rate was found. Next, Arnold (2014) compared 
bachelor programs between the academic years 2002-03 and 2007-08. During these years some 
programs implemented an AD policy (i.e. intervention group) while others did not (i.e. control group). 
He proves that the introduction of an AD policy increased the first-year dropout rate and the 4-year 
completion rate of university students. Another study shows that an increase in credit threshold leads 
to an increase of student success (Task force studiesucces, 2009). Nevertheless, Stegers-Jager et al. 
(2011) observe that the presence of an AD policy did not lead to early dropout or higher completion 
rates during the first two years at medical school. Further, Arnold and Van de Brink (2010) claim that 
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the number of students languishing in scientific education will not necessarily be reduced by the 
introduction of a credit-threshold because students who are dismissed often do not get any help in 
selecting a new program, resulting in a poor performance in their next program. Finally, it is shown 
that while the introduction of a credit threshold leads to a positive change in study behavior, this 
introduction does not necessarily translate into a higher level of performance. This may indicate that 
students rather try to reach the credit requirements than acquiring as much knowledge as possible (De 
Koning et al., 2014).  
 
 
3.2 Student satisfaction 
As students nowadays are more “consumer oriented” and as higher education institutions are 
rewarded through performance-based funding, student satisfaction becomes increasingly important. 
Students who do not feel satisfied by their institution of choice, due to a mismatch between student 
expectations and institutional performance, have a high risk of dropping-out or transferring to another 
institution. Moreover, student satisfaction has a positive influence on student motivation, student 
retention, recruiting efforts and fundraising (Schertzer & Schertzer, 2004). 
Student satisfaction is a highly complex concept, influenced by various observed and 
unobserved factors. It is influenced by all experiences related to campus life, and not only to what 
happens to them in the classroom. However, universities and vocational institutes typically focus on 
the academic dimension of a student’s educational experience (e.g., student-to-faculty ratios and 
quality programs) (Elliott & Shin, 2002). As a consequence, Kotler and Fox (1995) observe that while 
students are, on average, highly satisfied with their academic programs, their satisfaction with the 
support services is low. We identify a number of institutional and student characteristics which 
literature argued to affect satisfaction.  
First, it seems that a substantive relationship with faculty or staff affects students’ satisfaction 
by deepening institutional connections and commitment (Peterson et al., 2001). Elliott (2002) 
indicates that faculty accessibility increases student satisfaction and positive feelings about college. 
Next, Wiers-Jenssen et al. (2002) observe that while students in universities and large state colleges 
are less satisfied, students at university colleges are more satisfied. They argue that the reason for this 
result is two-fold. First, the institutional size can have an independent influence on student 
satisfaction. Second, universities and large state colleges may be more research-oriented than smaller 
higher education institutes, resulting in research drift of staff (Dill, 2001) and a lower focus on 
teaching-activities which might result in lower satisfaction (De Witte et al., 2013). Third, male-female 
differences result into significant differences in satisfaction with college (Adelman, 1991; Rienzi et 
al., 1993). Most studies find that woman report lower levels of satisfaction with college compared to 
men. However, Umbach and Porter (2002) report that the proportion of female undergraduates in a 
department is highly correlated with satisfaction concerning education in the major and with personal 
skill development. The class level (graduate of undergraduate) can also influence satisfaction. Tan and 
Kek (2004) find mixed results concerning satisfaction with service quality and class level. While at 
university A graduates perceived a higher level of service quality in comparison to undergraduates, 
the opposite was true in university B.  Finally, Krohn and O’Conner (2005) suggest that academic 
effort has a positive association with satisfaction. The effort devoted to a course or program may 
produce satisfaction directly if students find the activity of studying satisfying on itself. In addition, 
the results of that effort, e.g. knowledge and grades, may lead to satisfaction.  
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The combination of increased institutional accountability, performance agreements with student 
satisfaction as target and the increased use of AD policies, makes it important to know what will 
happen to student satisfaction. However, this relationship has not yet been empirically investigated. 
One Dutch descriptive study (Onderwijs Evaluatie Rapport, 2007) mentions that students judge the 
AD policy as something positive. However, students who obtained almost all first-term credits found 
it a more positive measure in comparison to students who obtained a limited number of first-term 
credits. These findings tend towards an increase of student satisfaction since students who obtained a 
high number of credits are likely to be retained by the AD policy. 
 
4. Identification strategy, data and assumptions 
4.1 Identification strategy 
To estimate the influence of the introduction of an AD policy on student dropout, graduation and 
satisfaction, we apply a difference-in-differences (DiD) type of estimator. It is one of the most popular 
tools to evaluate the effect of interventions on some relevant outcome variables (Abadie, 2005). 
Although we claim that AD policies are introduced in a rather exogenous way (see section 4.2), we 
have to account for the time trend as the control and intervention group in this study are not identified 
at the same time but in a different chronological academic year. A chronological time trend can lead 
to a biased estimate of the effect of introducing an AD policy. The DiD approach accounts for this 
time trend by including an extra control group of academic programs which will never implement an 
AD policy. Moreover, the traditional DiD examines the effect of a treatment by comparing the 
treatment group after treatment against the treatment group before treatment and against a control 
group. The outcome Y for study program i is traditionally modeled by the following equation: 
   
where the α denotes a constant term, β the treatment group (D=1: treatment) specific effect, γ is the 
estimated coefficient for the time trend (t = 0: pre-treatment, t=1: post-treatment) common to control 
and treatment group, δ stands for the variable of interest as it estimates the effect of the treatment, and 
εi is an error term. As revealed by the interaction effect, the DiD estimator is defined as the difference 
in average outcome in the treatment group before and after the treatment minus the difference in 
average outcome in the control group before and after treatment (Albouy, 2004):  
In typical DiD estimations the treatment is a one-time change in policy equally applied to all 
members of the treatment group. Due to the equal application, the treatment and control groups can be 
identified. Because it is a one-time change, specific pre- and post-treatment points in time can easily 
be selected. Our study tends to differ from the typical treatment in one important way. AD policies 
have not been one-time events but have been implemented gradually over multiple years. Taking this 
issue in consideration, we apply the following model: 
where tt is a dummy variable for each year (from 2003-04 until 2008-09, where 2003-04 is the 
reference year) and Di a dummy variable that assumes 1 for all programs which eventually applied an 
AD policy and else 0. The model is completed by the AD policy intervention dummy, a categorical 
interaction variable that is 1 for programs after the start of an AD policy and 0 else (see table 1). We 
further add additional time (t) and program (i) specific control variables X. This increases the 
efficiency and consistency of the variables of interest. Note that in the suggested identification 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝐷𝑖 +  𝛾𝑡𝑖 +  𝛿 (𝐷𝑖. 𝑡𝑖) +  𝜀𝑖 (1) 
𝛿𝐷𝑖𝐷 =  ?̅?1
𝑇 −  ?̅?0
𝑇 − ( ?̅?1
𝐶 −  ?̅?0
𝐶  ) (2) 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽(𝐷𝑖) +  𝛾 ∑ 𝑡
𝑡
+  𝛿 𝐴𝐷_𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑋𝑖𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑡  (3) 
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strategy, the control group consists of all study programs which have never implemented an AD 
policy, whereas the treatment group is created from all study programs which eventually have 
implemented a study program. We discuss and test the assumptions behind this identification strategy 
in Section 4.2.  
 
Table 1: Schematic presentation of the identification strategy 
  Control group Treatment group 
Before 
implementation AD policy 
d=0; t=0 d=1; t=0 
After implementation 
AD policy 
d=0;  t=1 d=1; t=1  
 
Figure 3 presents the identification strategy graphically. The horizontal axis represents the 
time and the vertical axis the outcome variable. The upper curve represents the outcome variables of 
the control group, and the lower curve represents the outcome variables of the treatment group. The 
dashed line indicates the implementation of the AD policy at a certain moment in time, while the 
arrow measures the difference in outcome variables caused by the treatment (i.e., the difference 
between the observed and counterfactual outcome). The figure illustrates that our analyses take three 
different effects into account: the ‘period/cohort’ specific effects, the ‘treatment group’ specific 
effects and the effects due to the implementation of an AD policy. Including the ‘treatment group’ 
specific effects is important as academic degrees which implement an AD policy might have different 
(un)observed characteristics than academic degrees without an AD policy (see section 4.3 for an 
extensive discussion).  
 
 
Figure 3: Visual representation of the identification strategy 
 
4.2 Assumptions behind the identification strategy 
The identification strategy relies on some assumptions, which we discuss and test next.  
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First, the control group should be a well comparable group for the treatment group. We test 
this assumption by checking whether characteristics of the control and intervention group differ 
significantly (see section 4.3). Since some of the characteristics are significantly different, we cope 
with this issue in two ways. First, we include the variables as control variables in the regression 
analysis such that existing heterogeneity among the control and treatment group is absorbed. Second, 
as a robustness test, we use a propensity score matching to select a well comparable control group. 
The matching results (see section 6.1) confirm the robust outcomes.  
As a second assumption, the ‘common trend assumption’ argues that, before the 
implementation of an AD policy, the trend of the observed and unobserved variables between the 
group of programs that eventually will implement an AD policy and the control group should be 
similar. We test the assumption by examining whether the difference between the two described 
groups changes significantly between two subsequent years in the period before the introduction of an 
AD policy. The results indicate that the common trend assumption is met for all years for the 
variables student dropout and student graduation (Appendix A, Table 1-3).  The results for the 
variables concerning satisfaction show that the assumption is not always met. Specifically for the  
subsequent years 2003-04 and  2004-06, and 2005-06 and 2006-07. Consequently, observations for  
those years will be included in a second robustness check (see section 6.2). The above results may be 
explained by the fact that student satisfaction can rapidly change due to changes in the educational 
environment (Elliott & Shin, 2002). Student dropout and graduation do not respond as quickly.   
The ‘Stable Unit Variance Assumption’ (STUVA) requires that the outcomes are not 
influenced between the control and treatment group. The common perception that an AD-policy is 
implemented institution-wide is wrong. Often programs in the same institution decide individually 
whether they implement an AD policy. Students who follow different programs and who are at 
different faculties or even at different institutions have little possibilities to interact and influence each 
other. Students who received a negative AD and decided to follow a new program at a different 
institution are able to influence the opinions of their new peers. However, we do not expect that this 
situation will reshape the perceptions of the fellow students drastically.  
Fourth, the AD policy should be introduced in a rather exogenous way. Proving that the AD 
policy is introduced exogenously would require qualitative evidence, which is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Nevertheless, from the annual reports we know that the introduction and strengthening of 
an AD policy does not depend on certain institutional or program characteristics. Moreover, we can 
test the correlation between the introduction of an AD policy and program and/or institutional 
characteristics such as quality and the number of students. To have an indication on the program 
quality, we make use of the accreditations of the Dutch-Flemish Accreditation Organization (NVAO). 
The NVAO is an independent agency, founded by the Dutch and Flemish (i.e., the Dutch speaking 
region of Belgium) government to assess the quality of higher education. To test for potential 
correlation between program quality and program admission criteria, we estimate an institution fixed 
effect model with the introduction of AD policy as dependent variable, and various quality indicators 
as independent variables. The fixed effect regression mitigates the influence of institution fixed 
variation. The results, presented in Table 2, indicate that the introduction of an AD policy does not 
correlate to the quality of an institution. In a second model we include the institutional characteristics 
student enrollment and student-staff ratio to account for fast growing institutions (Table 4). The 
results indicate that the variable AD policy is independent of the student-staff ratio. However, the 
variable AD policy depends on the number of students enrolled. This indicates that when an institution 
knows a sudden growth of students, it often introduces an AD policy. To control for the influence of 
the student enrollments, we add this variable to the further analyses.    
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Given that we fulfill the above conditions, we are able to estimate the average treatment effect 
of the treated (ATT). Specifically, ATT is the average effect on student dropout, student graduation, 
and student satisfaction caused by to the introduction of an AD policy. In figure 3, this effect is 
presented by the dashed arrow (see section 4.1). 
 
Table 2: Institution fixed effect model with the variable “AD policy” as outcome variable. 
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 
  Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Constant  .848*** .019 .520*** .093 
Quality indicators (NVAO-data):     
 - Program requirements -.001 .012 .001 .012 
 - Staff requirements -.019 .012 -.020 .012 
 - Improvement measurements -.003 .012 -.004 .012 
 - Achieved level .004 .008 .004 .008 
Student enrollment  
  
.000*** .000 
Student-staff ratio 
  
-.002 .003 
Number of observations 1,978 1,962 
Number of groups (fixed effects at 
institution level) 50 47 
Where ***, **, and * denote, respectively, significance at 1, 5 and 10%-level.  
 
 
4.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
4.3.1 Data 
The data are obtained from the Dutch Ministry of Education (‘Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs’, DUO). 
They include information at academic degree level (e.g. biology, applied linguistics) concerning the 
number of first-year students, the dropout rate, the number of students who re-enroll after the first 
year, and student graduation rates for all higher education institutes for the years 2010 and 2011. The 
academic degree is the set of courses that a student follows in order to obtain a degree (e.g., bachelor 
in economics). The data also include the above indicators on the field of study for all years between 
2003 and 2011. The field of study (e.g., technique, law, nature and economics) denotes to which 
academic field the program belongs.  
The data have two limitations, which we need to deal with. First, we lack academic degree-
level data from 2003-09. We deal with this by effectively combining the field of study data of 2003-
09 with the program level data of 2010-11. The underlying assumption is that the trend of the 
indicators on program-level is similar to the trend of the indicators on field of study-level.
6
 This 
assumption holds as the final data are similar to reports by field organizations. As a second limitation, 
we cannot make a distinction between programs at different locations of the institution. Therefore, we 
exclude the programs that did not implement an AD policy simultaneously at all locations.  
The output variables are defined as follows. Student dropout is defined as the percentage of 
full-time bachelor students that leave the institution during the first year of enrollment. Student 
graduation is defined as the share of re-enrolled full-time bachelor students that obtained a degree at 
                                                          
6
 When the interpolation resulted in values larger than 100 percent or smaller than zero percent for the 
performance variables, this value is replaced by 100 percent or zero percent respectively. Further, we excluded 
programs that were terminated in 2010 or 2011, since this event can influence student success and student 
dropout of previous years. 
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the institution one year after the nominal study time. Consequently, in order to be included in this 
latter indicator, students enrolled in universities need to graduate in four years, while students enrolled 
at higher vocational institutes need to graduate in five years.  
 
We also obtained academic degree level (also called program) data from the annual national 
questionnaire on student satisfaction (‘nationale studentenenquête’, NSE). The survey is carried out 
by the organization Studiekeuze123 and includes information on the opinion of students about the 
program they are taking. The data also contain institutional information (e.g., the number of students 
and programs in the institution) and student characteristics (e.g., the percentage of woman or the 
percentage of first-year students). Although the NSE is an annual survey since 1991 it was not until 
1995 that the NSE was carried out on sufficient large scale. In 1995, the NSE became a questionnaire 
with a fixed division of student issues (Steenkamp et al., 2008b). As of 2003, the organization started 
to document the student outcomes of the surveys in (publicly available) digital databases (Steenkamp 
et al., 2008a).  
 The NSE data have three limitations. First, the student outcomes of the NSE were not (or just 
limited) registered in digital databases until 2003-04. Consequently, we do not have NSE information 
before 2003-04. Second, there is a break in the survey questions in 2009-10 which creates data 
comparability issues. Therefore, we only consider the surveys between 2003-04 and 2008-09. Third, 
at the time the data was collected, it was not yet possible to survey every program each year. 
Therefore large programs were surveyed every two years and small programs every three years 
(Steenkamp et al., 2008a). In order to obtain a balanced panel data set, Studiekeuze123 replaced 
missing data on student opinions by records from a previous year. The institutional characteristics, on 
the other hand, are annually adjusted.  
Between January and March, students in participating programs are invited to complete the 
questionnaire and to give their opinion about different aspects of the program. The main purpose of 
the NSE, the measurement of student opinions, is evaluated by 30 items on a ten point scale ranging 
from (1) very dissatisfied to (10) very satisfied. These 30 items are grouped into 10 dimensions and 
one measure of overall satisfaction. The categories are: content of the academic degree, electives, 
consistency, teaching methods, career preparation, teachers, campus facilities, campus buildings, 
communication, and feasibility (Steenkamp et al., 2008a).  
In the paper at hand, we focus on three central questions in the NSE questionnaire. First, 
students are asked about their overall satisfaction with the program (“Are you satisfied with your 
choice for this program at this institution?
7”). The next outcome variable focuses on a specific subject 
of student satisfaction, namely feasibility of the program (“Is the program feasible in the available 
time”). It measures whether students think they are able to complete the degree. In order to exploit the 
richness of the data, we construct an outcome variable (i.e., average NSE score) consisting of the 
average of all items surveyed in the NSE data. The latter variable has the advantage of being rather 
comprehensive and reducing the influence of extremely high or low items, which comes at the cost of 
having an imprecise interpretation (i.e., the average of all items). Note that the three outcome 
indicators applied in the paper are well behaved in terms of homogeneous variance and normal 
underlying distributions, such that parametric analyses can be applied.  
Because participation to the NSE is voluntary for each individual student the threat of 
selection bias exists. Although we are not able to investigate the bias at the individual student level, 
                                                          
7
 In the NSE of 2007 the central question changed into “give your overall judgment about the program”. An 
analyses of the density functions of both questions, shows that they are comparable.  
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we do not expect selection to be a serious issue. First, response rates are comparable with the response 
rates of other college student surveys. From the 588,571 students addressed in 2011, 35.2 percent 
returned a usable NSE survey. In 2010 a similar response rate of 35.1 percent was found (Broek et al., 
2012). For comparison, the National Survey of Student Engagement (NSSE) had an average 
institutional response rate of 30% in 2013 (NSSE, 2013). Second, by all stakeholders (university 
management, program directors, civil servants, student bodies) the NSE data are generally considered 
as a reliable and representative instrument. Third, as illustrative evidence of its importance and 
reliability, the data are also used in a new performance-based scheme to finance institutions based on 
performance agreements.  
Results of the NSE questionnaires are made public and are used for different purposes. On the 
one hand, the student assessments are used to maintain or improve internal quality. By analyzing the 
results it becomes clear which aspects already satisfy students and which aspects should be improved. 
On the other hand, the results are used to provide comparable information to students about the 
different academic programs and help them to make a good study choice. The latter is facilitated by a 
website and publication in influential magazines (studiekeuze123, 2012). 
 
To obtain our final sample, we combine the DUO and NSE data. We take a few restrictions into 
account. First, although AD policies were first implemented in 1997 we only focus on data between 
the years 2003-04 and 2008-09. This is the result of the limited data availability before 2003-04 and 
the break in NSE survey questions in 2009-10. We also focus on state funded institutions since these 
institutions have to decrease student dropout and increase graduation rates and student satisfaction in 
order to obtain funds. Consequently, these institutions will be more likely to introduce an AD policy. 
Next, the sample is restricted to bachelor programs as master programs do not have an AD policy. 
Thus, the final sample includes all bachelor programs in state funded higher vocational and university 
institutions between 2003-04 and 2008-09
8
. This dataset contains information about the dropout rate, 
the graduation rate, student satisfaction opinions, student characteristics and institutional information 
for each study program. The final sample includes 6,012 higher education degrees (i.e., an average of 
1002 study programs per year).  
 
4.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the study programs with (i.e., the treated group) and without 
(i.e., the control group) an AD policy. We observe that there are 266 unique programs in the control 
group, against 1,486 unique programs in the treatment group
9
. The institutional characteristics 
indicate that programs that implemented an AD policy tend to have more students enrolled and have a 
higher student-staff ratio. The descriptive statistics show no significant difference concerning the 
percentage of woman between program with an AD policy and programs without an AD policy. 
Further, programs with an AD policy have a higher percentage of students for the second and fourth 
year enrolled compared to programs without an AD policy. However, there is no significant 
difference concerning the percentage of students enrolled for the third year between both groups of 
                                                          
8
 Note that since programs which already implemented an AD policy before 2003-04 do not influence the 
regression specification, we exclude these programs from the analysis (it should be noted that including those 
observations results in very comparable outcomes; available upon request). 
9
 Note that the total sample consists of 6,012 study programs (see section 4.3.1). For clarity, in the 
descriptive statistics we present only the number of unique programs. Moreover, when a study program 
appears every year in the data set it is considered in the descriptive statistics as one unique program while in 
the total sample it is counted as six observations (i.e. one for every year).  
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programs. Finally, students in programs without an AD policy tend to study more as is indicated by 
the variable study time. 
Table 4 presents some descriptive statistics for the different outcome variables. The 
descriptive statistics show that all five outcome variables differ significantly between programs with 
and without an AD policy. The statistics show that more students drop out after the first year of 
enrollment in programs with an AD policy compared to student in programs without an AD policy. 
Students in programs that implement an AD policy also have a higher graduation rate compared to 
students in programs that do not employ an AD policy. Students in an institution without an AD 
policy have, on average, a higher overall satisfaction with their program than students in institutions 
with an AD policy. Students in institutions with an AD policy indicate that they find the program 
more feasible. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of student characteristics and equality of means between control and treatment group 
Variable 
Control/treat-
ment groupᵟ 
Number 
of obs. 
First quartile Mean Third quartile Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation 
T-test (dif= mean(0) 
- mean(1)) 
    Institutional Characteristics  
Number of unique 
programs 
0 266       
 
1 1,486       
Number of students 
0 812 17,220.00 18,621.33 23,794.00 990.00 29,524.00 6,742.82 
-3,551.43*** 
1 5,200 15,298.00 22,172.76 32.074,00 281.00 38,551.00 10,686.20 
Student-staff ratio 
0 812 5.30 6.08 6.81 1.92 16.56 2.99 
-6.57*** 
1 5,200 11.87 12.65 14.82 1.98 17.81 3.58 
   Student characteristics 
Woman in the program (%) 
0 811 27.78 49.95 71.42 .00 100.00 26.30 
.91 
1 5,197 25.00 49.04 74.57 .00 100.00 28.87 
First-year students (%) 
0 811 24.47 33.23 41.18 .00 86.67 13.44 
1.82*** 
1 5,197 22.39 31.41 39.13 .00 100.00 13.03 
Second-year students (%) 
0 811 18.75 24.41 28.57 .00 61.90 9.25 
-.75** 
1 5,197 19.25 25.16 30.56 .00 64.71 9.09 
Third-year students (%) 
0 811 13.79 20.23 25.81 .00 61.54 9.39 
-.16 
1 5,197 14.29 20.39 26.00 .00 62.22 8.99 
Fourth-year students (%) 
0 811 6.25 11.79 16.67 .00 57.14 7.67 
-4.96*** 
1 5,197 9.76 16.75 23.08 .00 61.54 9.60 
Fifth-year students (%) 
0 811 .00 5.40 8.22 .00 30.00 5.89 
1.67*** 
1 5,197 .00 3.72 5.88 .00 46.15 4.44 
Seniors (%) 
0 811 .00 4.11 5.312 .00 61.82 4.11 
1.97*** 
1 5,197 .00 2.14 3.12 .00 33.33 2.14 
Study time 
0 787 25.88 29.36 33.46 11.27 44.60 6.21 
3.13*** 
1 5,161 20.19 26.23 31.55 10.50 50.14 7.28 
Where *** denotes significant at 0.01%-level. ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
ᵟ 0: No AD policy implemented (the control group). 1: AD policy has been eventually implemented (the treatment group) 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the outcome variables, and equality of means between control and treatment group 
Variable 
Control/treat-
ment groupᵟ 
N First quartile Mean Third quartile Min Max SD 
T-test (dif= 
mean(0)-mean(1) 
Student dropout 
0 607 10.50 17.25 23.20 0 100.00 11.16 
-8.83*** 
1 2,954 18.50 26.08 32.10 0 100.00 12.27 
Student graduation 
0 593 40.90 52.48 64.60 0 100.00 17.79 
-10.61*** 
1 2,418 52.30 63.09 75.70 0 100.00 18.33 
Overall Satisfaction with 
the program  
0 560 7.30 7.52 7.75 6.37 8.57 .34 
.48*** 
1 2,909 6.69 7.04 7.37 5.00 9.00 .48 
Average NSE score (own 
constructed variable from 
the means of all 
questionnaire items) 
0 812 6.91 7.07 7.24 6.19 7.97 .26 
.31*** 
1 5,200 6.54 6.76 6.96 5.43 8.11 .32 
Feasibility of the program 
0 367 6.23 6.51 6.96 3.87 8.05 .72 
-.43*** 
1 2,062 6.67 6.94 7.28 3.40 8.67 .53 
Where *** denotes significant at 0.01%-level. ** p<0.5; * p<0.1 
ᵟ 0: No AD policy implemented (the control group). 1: AD policy has been eventually implemented (the treatment group) 
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5. Results 
5.1 Trend analysis 
Before presenting the estimation results, we obtain some intuitive information on the data by a trend 
analysis. In particular, we plot the relationship between the AD policy and the outcome variables at 
different points in time before and after the implementation. To do so, we create a variable equal to 0 
for the year in which the AD policy is introduced in the academic program. The years after the 
introduction receive a positive number, while the years before the introduction correspond to a 
negative number.  
 We observe that student dropout and student graduation both increased around the 
introduction of an AD policy (Appendix B, Figure 1-2). The trend is in line with Bénabou and Tirole 
(2003) who predict that setting a performance standard results in motivating some students to improve 
their performance while discouraging others to making an attempt at all. Consequently this latter 
group will drop out.  
The trend analysis for overall satisfaction with the program (Appendix B, Figure 3) suggests a 
decline of overall student satisfaction in the year the AD policy is first employed. This trend is 
confirmed for the average NSE score, which indicates a steep decline the year the AD policy is 
introduced (Appendix B, Figure 4). The above trend is in line with labor market studies that report 
that organizational stress and job satisfaction are inversely related (e.g., Hollon & Chesser, 1976; 
Miles, 1976). In a similar vein, Cotton et al. (2002) link characteristics of student work environment, 
such as high work pressure, low control and low support, to psychological stress. The work design 
influences satisfaction in a similar way, meaning that high demands and low control results in low 
satisfaction (Cotton et al. 2002). The implementation of an AD policy can have a similar effect on the 
work design of students, causing more pressure to perform well during their first year of enrolment. In 
turn this pressure can result in higher levels of stress and lower levels of satisfaction.  
Figure 5 (Appendix B) represents the relationship between students’ opinions regarding the 
feasibility of the program before and after the implementation. Concerning feasibility of the program, 
the trend of the student opinions can go two-way. First, first-year students may find the program less 
feasible as they have to achieve a minimum number of credits, resulting in lower opinions. Second, 
students who passed the credit threshold, may find the program more feasible and rate the likelihood 
of completing the program higher. Looking at the figure, we observe that students find the program 
more feasible in the year the AD policy is first introduced. Further, we observe a steep decline in 
satisfaction with program feasibility one year before the introduction of an AD policy. This decrease 
can be due to an announcement effect. 
It should be noted that Figure 1 and 2 provide evidence for the rather ‘exogenous’ 
introduction of an AD policy. As we do not observe that academic degrees introduce an AD policy 
because of increasing dropout rates or declining graduation rates, it makes us more confident on the 
exogeneity assumption.   
While the above analyses describe the trends of the outcome variables in relation to different 
points before and after the introduction of an AD policy, one drawback of this method is that we do 
not have a control group. The use of a control group is needed in order to eliminate temporary trends 
in the outcome variable or effects of events, other than the treatment, that occurred between the 
measuring periods. To overcome this problem, we will apply the suggested difference-in-differences 
type of estimator.   
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5.2 Difference-in-Differences type of estimator 
The estimation results for Equation (3) are presented in Table 5. The results indicate that the 
introduction of an AD policy (captured by the variable of interest AD policy) is significantly 
correlated to all outcome variables. The results suggest that the introduction of an AD policy leads to 
a significant increase of student dropout and student graduation
10
. Moreover, due to the introduction 
of an AD policy, student dropout will increase by 7.5% while student graduation will increase by 
3.3%. The results further show that the introduction of an AD policy leads to a significant decrease of 
overall satisfaction (i.e. .48 point on a ten point scale) and average NSE score (i.e. .36 point on a ten 
point scale). Perceived program feasibility increases significantly due to the implementation of an AD 
policy (i.e. .43 point on a ten point scale). 
The group specific effects explain also a part of the variation in student performance and 
student satisfaction. The results show that programs that eventually will implement an AD policy have 
a higher level of student dropout and student graduation in comparison with programs that will never 
employ an AD policy. Next, programs that will apply an AD policy (i.e., D = 1) receive a higher 
average NSE score compared to programs that will never apply an AD policy at some point in time.  
Looking at the time-specific effects, we observe mixed results. First, the results for student 
dropout show no time-specific results. For student graduation we only detect a decline in the 
academic year 2007-08 in comparison to the reference year. Furthermore, it seems that overall student 
satisfaction and satisfaction with program feasibility decreases in time. However, while the average 
NSE score in the years 2005-06 and 2008-09 is higher than in 2003-04, it is lower in the years 2006-
07 and 2007-08 compared to 2003-04.   
 
We additionally run a second model specification which includes various covariates (see table 
6). We also cluster the standard errors at the level of the academic field of the program (i.e. field of 
study), such as economics, medicine or law. Finally, we add the variable student enrollment, which 
was indicated in section 4.2 to correlate with the introduction of an AD policy. The results are in line 
with our previous outcomes. In particular, we observe that an AD policy has a significant positive 
influence on student dropout, student graduation and satisfaction with program feasibility. 
Specifically, student dropout, student graduation and satisfaction with program feasibility rise by 
5.8%, 7% and .33 point (on a ten point scale) respectively. The implementation of an AD policy has 
again a significant negative influence on overall student satisfaction (i.e. .35 point on a ten point 
scale) and average NSE score (i.e. .26 point on a ten point scale).  
Significantly more students in programs that eventually will implement an AD policy drop out 
and graduate on time in comparison to students in programs that will never introduce an AD policy. 
Students in programs that eventually will introduce an AD policy have a significantly higher overall 
satisfaction and NSE scores compared to students in programs that will never employ an AD policy.  
It is observed that student graduation is declining in later years. The results indicate that 
programs receive significantly lower scores for overall satisfaction and satisfaction with program 
feasibility in later years. The average NSE scores decline in the academic years 2005-06 and 2008-09 
in comparison to the academic year 2003-04. These results are consistent with a study of Steenkamp 
et al. (2008b) that satisfaction of students, measured by the NSE, decreased slightly from 1996 until 
2005.  
                                                          
10
 A factor analysis points out that student dropout and student graduation are no substitutes (uniqueness 
of the estimates is .9455) and thus should be included separately in the analyses.  
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We find with respect to the covariates that programs with a high percentage of female 
students have a lower dropout rate and receive higher satisfaction compared to programs with a low 
percentage of female students. This is in line with findings by Bruinsma (2004), Andrews et al. 
(2012),  and Umbach and Porter (2002). Further, we observe that programs with a higher percentage 
of students who are enrolled for two, three or four years have a significantly higher graduation rate 
than programs with a higher percentage of first-year students. Programs with a high percentage of 
students enrolled for the fifth year have a significant lower graduation rate than programs with a high 
percentage of first-year students. This finding is not surprising since students enrolled for the fifth 
time (in the same program) will not graduate within the nominal study time, while students enrolled 
for the second, third or fourth time can still graduate on time. The results also show that programs 
with a high percentage of students who are enrolled for four years have significantly lower scores on 
overall satisfaction than programs with a high percentage of first-year students. We find similar 
results for the average NSE score. More specifically, students enrolled for two or four years have a 
significantly lower average NSE score compared to first-year students. Interestingly, we find that 
students enrolled for more than five years have a significantly higher NSE score. Concerning the 
feasibility of the program, programs with a high percentage of students who are three or four years 
enrolled score significantly higher on the feasibility of the program compared to programs with a high 
percentage of first-year students. This result was expected as most students enrolled for the third or 
fourth year passed the credit-threshold, resulting in a higher likelihood of graduating compared to 
first-year student. However, programs with a high percentage of students who are five years or longer 
enrolled show significantly lower satisfaction with program feasibility compared to programs with a 
high percentage of first-year students. These students may fear that they will not pass, resulting in a 
lower satisfaction with the feasibility of the program compared to students enrolled for the first time. 
Next, as expected, we find a significant negative relationship between study time and student dropout 
and a significant positive relationship between study time and student graduation. We also observe 
that programs receive higher overall satisfaction and average NSE score when students study more. 
Surprisingly, satisfaction regarding feasibility of the program is negatively correlated with study time. 
As we do not know the direction of the correlation, reverse causality might be an issue here. Finally, 
we observe that the variable student enrollment has a small significant influence on all outcome 
variables.   
 Various alternative specifications deliver similar outcomes, but are not reported here to save 
some space (available upon request). Additional control variables include the average number of 
credits achieved by the students in the program and the type of admission criteria to enter the 
program. Similar results are found when the variables number of years enrolled and study time are 
excluded from the analysis. By clustering at the institutional level, at location level and at program 
level, we find robust outcomes concerning the direction of the relationships. The significance of the 
results sometimes decreases, but this is not surprising since the analyses are done in smaller groups of 
observations.   
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Table 5: Regression outcomes of Equation (3) 
  
Student dropout Student graduation Overall satisfaction Average NSE score Satisfaction with 
program feasibility 
  Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Intercept 17.028*** 1.636 54.346*** 2.527 7.804*** .031 7.072*** 0.183 6.647*** .045 
D (0= never an AD policy) 1.934** .908 6.856*** 1.399 0.050 .033 .046** .021 .059 .058 
Year ( 2003-04= ref. year)           
2004-05 -2.169 1.730 0.977 2.672 -0.061 .038 -.016 .012 -0.038 .054 
2005-06 -0.083 1.688 -3.420 2.608 -.183*** .034 .051*** .012 -.280*** .056 
2006-07 1.567 1.687 -3.381 2.605 -.412*** .036 -.090*** .021 -.212*** .055 
2007-08 1.061 1.700 -4.604* 2.626 -.351*** .037 -.104*** .021 -.216*** .053 
2008-09 -0.240 1.708 2.878 2.774   
.118*** 0.025 -.158*** .057 
 
AD policy 
(0= before the 
implementation of an AD 
policy) 
7.469*** .820 3.271*** 1.196 -.481*** .030 -.357*** .019 .425*** .056 
N  3,561 3,011 3,092 5,600 2,429 
R² .102 .071 .291 .206 .108 
Adjusted R² .100 .069 .289 .205 .105 
Where ***, **, and * denote, respectively, significance at 1, 5 and 10%-level. The sample size varies due to missing values in the covariates. 
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Table 6: Regression outcomes for the DiD type of estimation with covariates for the outcome variables 
    
Student dropout Student graduation Overall satisfaction Average NSE score Satisfaction with 
program feasibility 
    Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Intercept 20.851*** 2.610 34.799*** 3.985 7.487*** .074 7.069*** .040 7.547*** .111 
D 
(0= never an AD policy) 
1.772** .823 6.426*** 1.279 .065** .030 .056*** .019 -.057 .052 
Year            
( 2003-04= reference year)           
2004-05 -.621 1.695 -1.417 2.461 -.153*** .039 -.013 .020 -.129*** .052 
2005-06 .807 1.658 -3.917 2.408 -.209*** .035 .045** .020 -.307*** .056 
2006-07 2.362 1.673 -4.708* 2.430 -.399*** .035 -.068*** .021 -.296*** .051 
2007-08 2.037 1.679 -6.465*** 2.440 -.250*** .038 -.021 .021 -.352*** .051 
2008-09 .575 1.678 .160 2.558   
.093*** .024 -.387*** .053 
 
AD policy 
(0= before the implementation of an AD policy) 
 
5.793*** .823 6.980*** 1.193 -.345*** .029 -.264*** .018 .329*** .050 
Gender 
(0= men) 
-.022** .010 .162 .017 .001*** .000 .001*** .000 .002*** .001 
Number of years in the program 
( reference category= 1 year)           
2 years -032 .205 .127*** .042 -.001 .001 -.002*** .000 0.001 .001 
3 years -.001 .024 .232*** .038 -.001 .001 -.001 .000 .003*** .001 
4 years -.028 .025 .127*** .041 -.004*** .000 -.004*** .000 .006*** .001 
5 years -.053 0.049 -.316*** .077 .001 .001 -.001 .001 -.028*** .003 
>5 years -.035 .058 -.014 .089 .001 .002 .003** .001 -.028*** .003 
Study time -.318*** .049 .197** .077 .012*** .001 .006*** .001 -.027*** .002 
Number of students .0001*** .000 -.0001*** .000 -.00001 .000 -.000 .000 .000*** .000 
Field of study YES YES YES YES YES 
N  3,539 2,997 3,032 5,489 2,409 
R² .096 .159 .316 .267 .237 
Where ***, **, and * denote, respectively, significance at 1, 5 and 10%-level. The sample size varies due to missing values in the covariates. 
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6. Robustness tests 
6.1 Propensity score matching 
 As a first robustness test we use propensity score matching (PSM). PSM is a statistical 
analysis that allows us to match treated units to non-treated units who have similar characteristics, 
hereby reducing the bias arising from working with an inappropriate control group (Dehejia & 
Wahba, 2002; Peikes et al., 2008; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). In particular, the possibility of bias 
arises when we estimate a treatment effect on groups with different characteristics. This increases the 
risk that the difference in outcome depends on the difference in characteristics, rather than it is caused 
by the treatment. Observational studies often have a problem of biasedness, because the assignment of 
treatment to research subjects is not randomized, resulting in a control and treatment group that are 
not balanced regarding covariates. Matching attempts to mimic randomization by creating a treatment 
group that is comparable on all observable characteristics to the control group.  
We match on the covariates at the institutional-level and student-level described in table 1. 
The former group of covariates consists of the student-staff ratio, and the number of students enrolled, 
while the latter group consists of gender, number of years enrolled, study time (as a proxy for the 
requirements of the program), and year of the questionnaire (given that students are more critical in 
later years than earlier years). Further, we include the variable vocational-university that indicates if 
the program is at university level or at vocational higher institute level and the variable field of study. 
To assess the validity of the comparison groups, we compare treatment-control group differences in 
outcomes (based on the quasi-experimental design) with treatment-comparison differences (based on 
the non-experimental PSM design). 
Table 7 shows that, for the treated units, student dropout and satisfaction regarding feasibility 
of the program decreases when based on the matched sample. However, student graduation, overall 
satisfaction and average NSE score are underestimated when based on the unmatched sample. 
Subsequently, with the exception of student graduation, the estimated effects by the PSM method are 
smaller than under the earlier estimations.  
More precisely, for student dropout, we find by the PSM a significant positive influence (t-
stat = 19.00), but compared to the regression specifications the effect loses some of its strength (t-stat 
= 8.79). Based on the unmatched sample, we find a significant positive impact (t-stat = 12.44) for 
student graduation. Regarding the average student satisfaction and the overall NSE score, we find a 
negative significant influence based on the unmatched sample (respectively, t-stat = -28.40 and t-stat 
= -32.66), compared to a smaller significant negative influence based on the matched sample 
(respectively, t-stat = -12.90 and t-stat = -11.74). For satisfaction with program feasibility both 
methods estimated impacts to be positive and significant (respectively, t-stat = 14.89 and t-stat = 
7.94). Note, that adding extra covariates, such as the average number of ECTS achieved by the 
students in the program and the type off admission criteria, deliver similar results.  
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Table 7: Robustness check of the five outcome variables using propensity score matching 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference SE t-stat 
Student dropout 
Unmatched 26.731 17.788 8.943 .471 19.00 
Matched 22.343 17.788 4.555 .518 8.79 
Student graduation 
Unmatched 63.642 54.394 9.248 .743 12.44 
Matched 67.450 54.394 13.056 .879 14.85 
Overall satisfaction 
Unmatched 7.007 7.530 -.523 .018 -28.40 
Matched 7.284 7.530 -.246 .019 -12.90 
Average NSE score 
Unmatched 6.733 7.080 -.347 .009 -32.66 
Matched 6.935 7.080 -.145 .011 -11.74 
Satisfaction with program 
feasibility 
Unmatched 6.960 6.541 .419 .028 14.89 
Matched 6.886 6.541 .435 .043 7.94 
 
 
6.2 Different subsamples 
 As a second robustness test we estimate Equation (3) for different subsamples. The first 
subsample consists of observations from the years 2003-04 and 2004-05. Between those years, the 
common trend assumption was not met (see appendix A, Table 1-3). The results, presented in Table 8, 
are identical to those obtained by the full sample, which yields confidence in the earlier results.  
Second, as the common trend assumption was not met for the years 2005-06 and 2006-07 (see 
appendix A; Table 1-3), we only include observations from those years in the second subsample. The 
results, presented in Table 9, indicate the robustness of the outcomes.  
Third, we include only observations from higher education institutes in urban areas. This 
distinction is made as students from urban and rural areas can differ in background, ethnicity, grade 
point average, socio-economic situation (SES), enrollment curriculum and educational level of parents 
(McCracken and Barcinas, 1991), which in turn may influence the findings. Again, we confirm our 
previous findings (see Table 10).  
We conclude that the estimation outcomes are robust for the different subsamples.  
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Table 8: Regression outcomes for Equation (3) using observations from the years 2003-04 and 2004-
05 
    
Student dropout Student graduation Overall satisfaction Average NSE score Satisfaction with 
program feasibility 
    Model 1 (without covariates) 
      Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
treatment effect 5.968*** 8.945*** -.362*** -.295*** .297*** 
 [1.443] [2.259] [.068] [.024] [.074] 
N 471 460 640 1,921 670 
R² .091 .178 .192 .195 .151 
adjusted R² .086 .173 .188 .193 .148 
    Model2 (with covariates) 
  
    Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
treatment effect 6.288*** 10.717*** -.344*** -.275*** .274*** 
 [1.599] [2.420] [.068] [.024] [.068] 
N 468 458 610 1,853 666 
R² .115 .225 .207 .267 .259 
Where ***, **, and * denote, respectively, significance at 1, 5 and 10%-level, standard errors between brackets. The sample 
size varies due to missing values in the covariates. 
 
 
Table 9: Regression outcomes for Equation (3) using observations from the years 2005-06 and 2006-
07 
    
Student dropout Student graduation Overall satisfaction Average NSE score Satisfaction with 
program feasibility 
    Model 1 (without covariates) 
      Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
treatment effect 7.711*** 3.217* -.513*** -.397*** .886*** 
 [1.157] [1.750] [.041] [.028] [.104] 
N 1,594 1,577 1,920 2,345 801 
R² .088 .044 .258 .209 .136 
adjusted R² .086 .043 .257 .208 .133 
    Model2 (with covariates) 
  
    Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
treatment effect 5.833*** 6.794*** -.307*** -.239 *** .644*** 
 [1.188] [1.712] [.035] [.027] [.099] 
N 1,586 1,569 1,892 2,311 789 
R² .080 .124 .252 .232 .270 
Where ***, **, and * denote, respectively, significance at 1, 5 and 10%-level, standard errors between brackets. The sample 
size varies due to missing values in the covariates. 
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Table 10: Regression outcomes for Equation (3) using observations from higher educational 
institutes in urban areas 
    
Student dropout Student graduation Overall satisfaction Average NSE score Satisfaction with 
program feasibility 
    Model 1 (without covariates) 
      Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
treatment effect 7.354*** 3.234** -.484*** -.352*** .338*** 
 [.946] [1.452] [.033] [.020] [.061] 
N 2,113 1,814 1,910 3,406 1,417 
R² .010 .059 .355 .242 .102 
adjusted R² .097 .055 .352 .240 .098 
    Model2 (with covariates) 
  
    Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
treatment effect 4.754*** 6.170*** -.329*** -.243*** .290*** 
 [.946] [1.384] [.031] [.019] [.056] 
N 2,109 1,810 1,881 3,357 1,415 
R² .101 .143 .341 .236 .244 
Where ***, **, and * denote, respectively, significance at 1, 5 and 10%-level, standard errors between brackets. The sample 
size varies due to missing values in the covariates. 
 
 
7. Conclusions, further research and policy implications 
The growing accountability of higher education institutes makes them increasingly selective in 
accepting students. Students in programs with academic dismissal (AD) policies can be removed from 
the institution when they do not make satisfactory study progress. It is thus a form of selection after 
the gate. The credit-threshold students must pass differs by institution and by academic degree. 
Although the effect of such an AD policy on performance is measured by a few studies (e.g. De 
Koning et al., 2014; Gijbels et al., 2004), little is known about the effect of this type of selection tool 
on student satisfaction. This paper is the first to examine empirically the effect of the introduction of 
an AD policy on both student performance and student satisfaction. Using Dutch nationwide data, the 
effect of the introduction of a student selection tool on student graduation, student dropout and student 
satisfaction is investigated.  
Our results suggest that, on average, student dropout and student graduation increased due to 
the introduction of an AD policy. Next, we found that the introduction of an AD policy leads to a 
decrease of student satisfaction. The outcomes also indicate that student satisfaction regarding 
program feasibility increases because of the implementation of an AD policy. Looking at the period 
specific effects, we observe that student graduation rates are lower in more recent years. This is an 
alarming finding since higher educational institutes are increasingly aware of the benefits of 
graduation ‘on time’. The results also indicate that student satisfaction used to be higher in the past. 
This result can be explained by the relationship between satisfaction and expectations. As students 
increasingly perceive themselves to be customers, due to the tuition fees and growth of consumerism 
in public services, their expectations rise (Tricker, 2005). In this context, expectations of students are 
high and include, for example, flexibility and choice in the delivery of education, and a two way 
communication process between themselves and the university (Davies, 2002). Due to this increase in 
expectations it is possible that the actual performance of the higher educational institutes is below the 
expectations of the students, resulting in dissatisfaction (Appleton-Knapp & Krentler, 2006; Bitner & 
Hubbert, 1994). Important to note is that the observed results are very robust.  
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This paper yields some insightful policy advice. An AD policy enables effective selection of 
students after the first year. While, for equity arguments, selection at the gate is often undesired, this 
paper indicates that selection after the gate might be effective. Nevertheless, the negative influence on 
student satisfaction suggests that the introduction of an admission policy should be complemented by 
measures to improve, or at least stabilize, student satisfaction.  
We observed that the AD policy is an effective selection tool. However, the level of the AD 
policy norm is also important. A very high AD policy threshold will probably not only result into a 
steep increase of graduation rates but also in a considerate increase in dropout rate. This can lead to 
the dismissal of many students who would have graduated on time. A too low AD policy norm, on the 
other hand, can result in too few dismissed students. Moreover, the optimal AD threshold is not easy 
to determine and depends on the type of academic program and the current dropout rate. A study 
program in the medical field, for example, will require more from students than a program in the 
social field, and will thus need a higher AD policy threshold to be an effective selection tool. Study 
programs with a current high dropout rate may not want to introduce an even higher norm because 
this can result in few students who are able to enroll in the second year. Programs with a low dropout 
rate can opt to start with a low credit norm during the first years after introduction and increase it if 
the selection does not seem sufficient. Important to note is that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ AD 
policy norm.  
 
This paper provides several lines for future research. First, the current study does not focus on 
the underlying mechanisms between an AD policy, student performance and student satisfaction, as 
we do not measure intervening process variables. Additional research is necessary to exploit the 
mechanisms between an AD policy and its outcome variables. Second, we investigated the effect of 
the introduction of an AD policy on performance and satisfaction using program-level data. As such 
we could not distinguish students in their first year and students in later years. Those two groups of 
students will respond different on an AD policy. Indeed, first-year students still need to face the AD 
policy while students in later years do not. We expect that the former group will be more affected by 
an AD policy in terms of performance. By using data on student-level, the effect of the introduction of 
an AD policy on performance and satisfaction of first-year students can be exploited. Third, because 
we could not distinguish students that received a negative obligatory advice, the treat of a selection 
problem exist. Future research can focus solely on this type of students and investigate the effect of 
receiving a negative advice on student satisfaction and on the academic career. Future research could 
also focus on whether students that received a negative obligatory advice and started a new study are 
more or less satisfied than students who never received a negative obligatory advice. This can have a 
large impact on the policy decisions of institutions. Fourth, it is also possible that students choose a 
study program based on the presence of an AD policy. If this is the case, more motivated and talented 
students will attend study programs with an AD policy. Future research can focus on investigating this 
matter. Finally, the study used a sample of Dutch higher education programs, and the extent to which 
the results are generalized to other countries is not known. Further research can generalize our results 
to other countries.  
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Appendix A – Parallel time trend assumption 
Table 1: Common trend assumption when AD policy is introduced in 2005-06 for the different outcome variables 
 
Year control group 
programs that eventually 
will implement an AD 
policy  
t-statistic11 p-value 
Student drop-out     
2003-04 17.67813 17.21000  
-0.50980 
 
0.303090 
   2004-05 16.22152 18.28000 
Student graduation     
2003-04 52.17097 68.85000  
0.60380 
   
0.52022 
2004-05 51.01867 64.28000  
Overall satisfaction     
2003-04 7.70232 7.61847 
0.61855 0.53700 
 
  
2004-05 7.64664 7.67334 
Average NSE score     
2003-04 7.04701 6.923773 
5.62012 .00000 
 
  
2004-05 7.05591 6.725286 
Satisfaction concerning program feasibility     
2003-04 6.60035 7.04879 
-0.5499 0.58300 
 
  
2004-05 6.56483 7.08615 
 
Table 2: Common trend assumption when AD policy is introduced in 2007-08 for the different outcome variables 
Year control group 
programs that 
eventually will 
implement an AD policy t-statistic p-value 
Student dropout     
2003-04 17.67813 16.32500  
0.8434    -0.19796 
2004-05 16.22152 15.85455  
0.9657 
   
-0.04308 
2005-06 18.58819 18.39565  
0.8089 
   
-0.24204 
2006-07 17.87905 18.74783   
Student graduation     
2003-04 52.10970 69.46250  
0.8794 
   
0.15009 
2004-05 51.01867 66.12727 
 0.8447 
   
-0.19605 
2005-06 50.84823 67.92174 
 0.9445 
   
0.06964 
2006-07 52.93219 69.41739 
       
 
 
                                                          
11 This t-statistic between four groups is estimated by applying the next formulas:  
1) T-test= difference/s.e.[(𝑌2̅ − 𝑌4̅) − (𝑌1̅ − 𝑌3̅)] 
2) Difference= (𝑌2̅ − 𝑌4̅) − (𝑌1̅ − 𝑌3̅) 
3) s.e.[(𝑌2̅ − 𝑌4̅) − (𝑌1̅ − 𝑌3̅)]=√([
𝑠2
2
𝑛2
] + [
𝑠4
2
𝑛4
]) + ([
𝑠1
2
𝑛1
] + [
𝑠3
2
𝑛3
]) 
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Overall satisfaction 
  
 
2003-04 7.70232 7.67035  
0.2008 
   
-1.2842 
2004-05 7.64664 7.85334  
0.5944 
   
0.53296 
2005-06 7.47936 7.58980  
0.0422 
   
2.26184 
2006-07 7.32302 7.19212   
Average NSE score 
  
 
2003-04 7.04589 7.01980  
0.2267 
   
-1.21106 
2004-05 7.05591 7.08703  
0.4209 
   
-0.80549 
2005-06 7.09764 7.17026  
0.0814 
   
1.74649 
2006-07 6.97333 6.92591  
 Satisfaction concerning program feasibility 
  2003-04 6.60035 6.84051 
 0.0018 
   
-3.16656 
2004-05 6.56483 7.44475 
 0.0290 
   
2.21044 
2005-06 6.41611 6.87112 
 0.3112 
   
-1.01641 
2006-07 6.522684 7.17342 
  
 
 
Table 3: Common trend assumption when AD policy is introduced in 2008-09 for the different outcome variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year control group 
programs that 
eventually will 
implement an AD policy t-statistic p-value 
Student drop-out     
2003-04 17.67813 20.450000  
0.9744 
 
  0.03220 
2004-05 16.22152 18.850000  
0.7928 
 
  0.26298 
2005-06 18.58819 20.44146  
0.8566 
 
  0.18084 
2006-07 17.87905 19.26667  
0.3783 
 
  -0.88230 
2007-08 16.09327 19.79394  
 Student graduation 
   2003-04 52.17097 43.85000  
0.1773 
 
  -1.35663 
2004-05 51.01867 52.40000  
0.9429 
 
  -0.07172 
2005-06 50.84823 52.61220  
0.8714 
 
  -0.16194 
2006-07 52.93219 55.49524  
-0.9186 
 
  -0.10224 
2007-08 49.88750 53.00303  
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Overall satisfaction 
   
2003-04 7.70232 7.83066  
0.3138 
 
  1.01004 
2004-05 7.64664 7.61804  
0.4012 
 
  -0.84056 
2005-06 7.47936 7.52537  
0.0073 
 
  -2.69522 
2006-07 7.32302 7.56727  
0.3785 
 
  0.8829 
2007-08 7.50859 7.64113  
      Average NSE score  
  
 
2003-04 7.04589 7.11589  
0.9260 
 
  -0.09305 
2004-05 7.05591 7.13176  
0.2876 
 
  1.06529 
2005-06 7.09763 7.10654  
0.05587 
 
  -1.91691 
2006-07 6.97333 7.11824  
0.0057 
 
  2.78928 
2007-08 7.11595 7.01874  
 Satisfaction concerning program feasibility 
 
 
2003-04 6.60035 6.46962  
0.7462 
 
  -0.32416 
2004-05 6.56483 6.52854  
0.3290 
 
  0.98012 
2005-06 6.41611 6.13018   
0.6631 
 
  -0.43661 
2006-07 6.52268 6.36784  
 
   
-0.34304 0.7320 
2007-08 6.45324 6.40105    
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Appendix B – Trend analysis 
 
 
 
Figure 1 (left): Trend of student dropout before (negative numbers) and after (positive numbers) the 
introduction of an AD policy  
Figure 2 (right) Trend of student graduation before (negative numbers) and after (positive numbers) 
the introduction of an AD policy  
 
 
 
Figure 3 (left): Trend of overall student satisfaction of bachelor’s students before (negative numbers) 
and after (positive numbers) the introduction of an AD policy  
Figure 4 (right) Trend of average NSE score of bachelor’s students before (negative numbers) and 
after (positive numbers) the introduction of an AD policy  
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Figure 5: Trend of feasibility of the program perceived by bachelor’s students before (negative 
numbers) and after (positive numbers) the introduction of an AD policy 
 
